175 /122 cont./ When the old Prince of Sidenreng died on
643 November 7, 1831, and La Pangorisang made his appearance
669 as the new prince, a fraternal war soon broke out" (1). And

1. Eerdmans, pp. 515-516.

later:

"Through our intervention, La Pangorisang had been reinstated in 1835 in the districts taken away from him during the war. He had been reconciled with Datoe Lampoele, who was permitted to settle in Sidenreng. Quietly, however, he hoped for help from Bone in order to attain his goal sooner or later: Sidenreng's throne. Consequently, Sidenreng remained divided into two parties hostile to each other" (2).

2. Eerdmans, p. 520.

662 Signs of opposition are to be found on each level in a
557 multiplicity of forms. The system of followers strengthens
571 the position of the combatants. The striving is directed at beating a superior with the help of as many inferiors by way of followers and as many equals by way of confederates as possible. One tries constantly to become the highest among one's equals. A certain unity of territory is always maintained in the struggle; opponents and allies are found by preference among one's neighbors. In this way, the entire Makassarese-Buginese country, each kingdom, each adat community, each kampong, and even each group of relatives, as well as each family with more than one man, is potentially a theatre of battle.

/123/ In each of these groupings, several individuals strive for more power within the territorially limited opportunities existing for them. In so doing, they are always faced with the competitive efforts of their equals among each other. For if someone, in a certain situation, believes that

662 /123 cont./ he can better serve goals for himself, his kin
557 group, and possibly for his country, by not keeping to a cer-
571 tain agreement, he withdraws. One cannot count upon loyalty between equals with respect to the agreements made among them. Loyalty unto death is to be found only between high and low (1).

> 1. Here, too, there are limits. Personal loyalty of a lower toward a higher person is held in esteem. But loyalty on the part of a related group of lower people toward a higher /group/ lasts as long as the former know themselves to be dependent upon the latter, and so long as they do not have a more powerful higher /group/ to which they can turn for help and protection.

Now, if we look a little more closely at a number of opposition phenomena on various levels, it appears that a general direction can be pointed out in spite of confusing differences.

622 The kapalakampong strives to keep his kapalaship for
554 himself and his kinsmen, for the person who has authority over a non-kinsman is higher than that non-kinsman.
602 Furthermore, his kinsmen, at least those within his kampong territory, share in the higher standing which he possesses in this way. With respect to the members of his own group of relatives and with respect to that of other groups residing in his territory, the position of the kapala is different. In his own group he belongs to the prominent men. In that capacity

621 /125 cont./ by interesting a member of the high nobility in
622 the case. Their help is of importance because (although this
66L is not based upon the election regulation) sometimes they declare the ballot invalid, or else report afterward that only a test ballot had been held, in case the result did not agree with their wishes (1).

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1. The 1927 regulation of the election of headmen is therefore not applied as was intended by the European administration which introduced it. Majority of votes is, according to Makassarese feelings, not sufficient in itself to capture the kapalaship. To this end, the consent of their own head is also required. This regulation, therefore, does not preclude arbitrary actions on the part of the higher people, but it does limit them.

622 The kapala can strengthen his position by establishing
662 a link with other kapala. The proved means of doing this is
634 to contract a marriage. But this action would immediately result in a power formation within the adat community, which the adat community head does not like to see. To an even greater degree this is the case if a kapala were to seek contact with a neighboring adat community head. Such an act would suggest a certain enmity toward the kapala's own /adat community/ head, for it is an immediate threat of defection from
177 his own head to the neighboring head. Insofar as is known,
634 the latter situation rarely occurred, because after 1905 these
648 defections were no longer left to the free interplay of

177 /125 cont./ Makassarese forces, but had to be approved by
634 the officials of the Inland Administration. This administration
648 in practice only rarely permitted boundary alterations. It preferred to hold fast to the boundaries fixed in the years after 1905.

622 The kapala can also seek to establish contact with the kin
662 group of the /126/ adat community head. A marriage between members of the two groups of relatives seems to be possible (1).

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1. In this connection one can remark that it is always a man from the adat community head's group who marries a girl of the kapala group. Some difference in standing is always considered to exist between adat community head and kampong head, and therefore between their groups of relatives. Through the marriage, the implication is avoided that a man is marrying a woman from a group of relatives with higher standing than his own. A cousin (samposikali) of the adat community head was thus joined in marriage with a daughter of the kapala of Bontoramba.

622 In the succession to the kapalaship, a clear preference for the son, at least for a close

622 /126 cont./ kinsman of the previous kapala, is demonstrable. In 7 of the 14 kampongs of the adat community of Borongloë, the kapala changed between 1939 and 1949. Three of these were succeeded by a son, one by a son-in-law, one by a younger cousin, and two by someone from another group of relatives. In the [626] first of these cases, the old kapala was a Sajid /Sayid?/, a stranger who was forced to leave the kampong and the adat community because of woman trouble. In the last case, the new kapala was a distant kinsman of the adat community head. This man had sailed across many seas as a KPM sailor. He possessed a quiet influence over people and was elected without much opposition.

622 It seems, therefore, that the kapala and the prominent
602 members of his group of relatives strive to maintain themselves
662 in their own kampong territory, to strengthen their own position if possible, and to raise their own standing outside the region by establishing ties with equal or slightly higher groups.

634 The adat community head conducts a policy which inside
602 his region is, in the first place, directed at making his own
662 group of relatives into as strong a unit as possible, and, in the second place, to strengthen as much as possible his influence in the kampong where he has no kinsmen living. The latter is done by establishing a marriage tie, or by trying to have a

602 /128 cont./ kinsman or a trusted follower named as kampong
634 head. Thus, at an election for a kapala, the brother of the
662 adat community head was set up as a candidate against a member of the leading group of relatives residing there. This
666 brother obtained a number of votes from members of the Rest group living there, but nevertheless lost the election. Only after the first ballot had been declared a test ballot, and the second produced the same result, did the adat community head give in.

634 The adat community head counteracts the formation of
661 power centers in his region. He looks with disfavor upon marriage connections between the closest kinsmen /127/ of his various Kapala, unless it is he himself who brings about such a marriage. Furthermore, he knows that an ornament which is in the hands of one of the Kapala groups always signifies a potential threat to him.

634 Insofar as he is concerned with affairs outside the adat
661 community, the adat community head generally endeavors
643 to establish ties either with his fellow adat community heads or with his prince and his kinsmen. The prince looks with disfavor upon the former practice for it threatens to create a direct power center within his realm. He would be even more averse to a tie between one of his adat community heads and a neighboring prince. Although this need not be expected from the heads of the adat communities lying close around the center of Goa, in the marginal, mountainous regions
634 the situation is different. There it has happened that a local
643 head defected from his prince in order to follow another (1).
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1. "Although the mountain Makassarese continued for a long time to resist a union with the maritime Makassarese, and in 1817 under Aroe Mampoe submitted to the new Prince of Goa,

634 /127 cont./ Karaeng Lembangparang,
643 Aroe Bakara had neverthe-
652 less obtained some following among them. This following grew gradually and made it possible for him to cause the greatest part of the Goa mountain districts to defect from their Prince."
Eerdmans, p. 398.

These heads, living along the frontiers of the realm, frequently did not so much follow the most powerful of their neighbors, but rather the one who permitted them the greatest freedom of action in their territories. After 1905 the boundaries were also fixed in this area.

In the interior the prince tries to create as powerful a unity as possible in his kingdom by working for unity in his own related group in the first place and, furthermore, by extending as much as possible his influence in the adat communities under his jurisdiction.

The Prince of Goa conducted this policy successfully during the years preceeding the outbreak of the Second World War. In a short period of time he succeeded in having one of his kinsmen appointed as adat community head in two of these adat communities.

602 These two former heads' respective groups of relatives
634 went down in standing through this action. After all, they
558 derived this standing in the very first place from the headship, and now they seemed to have been pushed back into the rank
602 of the ordinary groups of relatives. At this moment they
634 merely endeavored /128/ to surround the new adat community
662 head of karaeng blood as much as possible with their own
557 people, so that they could still remain leaders among the

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/128 cont./ other groups of relatives in their adat communities, even though in this position they merely carried out the commands of the karaëng.

The karaëng, on his part, constantly tried to break through this tie which was, as it were, placed on him, by seeking contact with the prominent members of the other groups. The latter saw in this a chance to occupy a prominent position in the adat community through the karaëng, a position which they had not enjoyed previously. On the other hand, they did not dare to place themselves too much in the foreground in relation to the kin groups of the former heads, taking into account what might happen if the Prince's influence, at present penetrating more deeply, should again diminish.

The adat community heads who had remained in power felt themselves threatened by the Prince's political successes. "We are becoming unimportant," said one of them.

648 In a discussion of the relationship of the prince of Goa to his fellow princes, three different points must be kept in mind. First, territorially speaking we go beyond Goa in such a discussion. The entire Makassarese-Buginese region then becomes the field of investigation. Secondly, due to the fact that a number of events that took place at the courts of the princes were more or less regularly recorded during the last few centuries, we are able to use a number of historical data in this discussion which are unknown to the adat community heads and kampong heads. Thirdly, we must first indicate the position of the Netherlands East India Company and later the Government of the Dutch East Indies with respect to this opposition, which was ultimately intended to capture the hegemony of South Celebes.

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648 If we look at what Eerdmans reports about this, we get the impression that the conduct of the Netherlands East India Company repeatedly brought about a reversal in the power relations existing at that moment, but that this did not produce any alteration in the manner in which the princes

/131 cont./ circumstances the appearance of daëng Mangemba became temporarily possible in 1927. For this, see Z(entgraaff), Celebesproblemen, pp. 5 ff.

177 643 602 662 With the disappearance of these figures, however, the opposition within the circle of the prince and his closest relatives did not disappear. After all, this opposition has its basis within the family in the relationship between the brothers. What disappeared was merely the form of opposition described by Kooreman in 1883, a power within the realm under the leadership of a man of high nobility, based upon force directed against the prince.

The opposition itself remained dormant. In the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, it emerged principally in a number of questions concerning hereditary succession.

In 1949 it again became apparent, this time in parliamentary form. It appeared that relatives of the various princes and Self-government members had seats in the representative councils which at that time were set up both for the daërah (the South Celebes Council), as well as for a number of kingdoms (among others the Bone Council). Compared to their ruling kinsmen, these men of the nobility are progressive individuals, but in a number of cases their endeavors merely seem aimed at eliminating the ruling prince and at one of them becoming the prince himself. They conduct the traditional South Celebes policy merely under new names and in new forms.

177 648 In November, 1948, the High Hadat (Hadat Tinggi) for the entire region of the daërah of South Celebes was set up. It was intended as an administrative body in which the various princes should have a seat. Unity was thereby created which